Friday, January 21, 2011

Japan Commercial Real Estate Declines by 20% in value over last 2 years

Japan Commercial Real Estate Declines by 20% in value over last 2 years

Japanese commercial real estate markets has fallen by 20% over the two and a half years to the end of the third quarter 2010, the IPD Japan Monthly Indicator shows.


Japan, the world’s second-largest commercial property market by value, is one of the few major real estate markets to continue to record capital depreciation, reflecting the country’s weak economic growth.

By the end of the third quarter of last year, up to which point IPD has its most current Japanese data, UK, the US and Australia had all emerged into positive capital growth. In the UK, the rebound was a significant 17.4%, while the US had risen by 5.5% over the previous six months and Australia had recovered by a modest 1.1%.

Back in Japan, the annual rate of capital depreciation was -6.3% at the end of September 2010 – the shallowest rate of capital decline since December 2008 and a significant improvement on the -12.2% annual capital growth rate in September 2009.

The retail sector, driven by improved consumer confidence, has continued to buck the trend of the broader market by showing an upturn in the capital growth recovery, ending September with an annual capital return of -2.8%. This is the shallowest rate of capital depreciation since July 2008.

At the other extreme is offices, which is running at an annual capital depreciation of -8.3%, reflecting the continuing economic malaise. Between the two sectors is residential, which had an annual capital growth rate of -4.5% to end September 2010.

Sunday, January 16, 2011

Travis Smiley Presents: "America The Next Chapter"

Travis Smiley Presents: "America The Next Chapter". This shows how different opinions and views can debate on the facts peacefully. Without rhetoric or fictional thinking.



The great difference comes from the notion of where greatness comes from.

For someone like Dr West greatness comes from the good people having good education and sweating a lot to do great things.

Maria Bartiromo comes from a world where trading papers creates profit with no work and no sweat at all, a world where the money is created from nothing and then has to come from some place that ends up being the bailouts, paid for by the workers, from their sweat.

Wednesday, January 12, 2011

Does Japans Really Matter?

During the holidays, I pondered on Japans economy and found the least bad route was by asking myself a series of questions.


Does Japan really matter?
Yes, for two reasons. Its experience with a massive asset bubble collapse, a paralyzed banking sector and years of deflation suggest how events might play themselves out in the U.S., which seems to be suffering an echo of Japan’s misfortunes. But even if Japan isn’t a template for the U.S., how Japan’s economy plays itself out could be of significance for the global financial system. Japan, after all, remains the second largest developed-world economy, remains the richest large economy on a per capita basis and has a huge financial sector.
Can the U.S. escape Japan’s plight?
Fed chairman Ben Bernanke certainly thinks so, and is doing his utmost to ensure the U.S. does. That’s what was behind both rounds of quantitative easing: making sure Japan-style deflation isn’t repeated.
Could Japan finally be on the cusp of a “normal” recovery?
The premise behind two decades of routine and extreme monetary and fiscal stimulus has been that Japan suffers from a shortfall in aggregate demand caused by the 1990 stock market and real estate bust. The central Keynesian thesis has always been that once Japan’s banking sector could be cleared up and its excess capacity shrunk, the economy would move back to self-sustaining growth. But Japan has had 15 years of near-zero interest rates and deficit spending that’s taken the government’s net debt from 12% of GDP in 1992 to a forecast 130% this year. Growth looked reasonable during the early parts of the new millennium. But at between 1.9% and 2.7%, it was paltry relative to the pace that prevailed during the 1980s, when Japan was on top of the world and GDP was expanding at an average annual rate of nearly 4.5%. What’s more, even the growth of the last decade continued to be heavily dependent on official stimulus. Could it be that demographics rather than a shortfall in aggregate demand is behind the decline in Japan’s trend growth? But if that’s the case, why isn’t inflation picking up?
Is Japan reaching the limits of Keynesian stimulus?
Even at a mere 1.2% yield on 10-year Japanese government bonds, Japan’s enormous official debt load means that interest payments alone soak up more than a quarter of government revenue. The IMF expects Japan to run annual deficits worth 7.5% of GDP for much of the coming decade. At some point investors will start to worry about getting paid. Not that Japan is likely to default, the debt is in its own currency, which the Bank of Japan can print at will. But they might start to get the nagging feeling that the government has no control of its deficits and no ability to cut them back and that the money printing will become straight debt monetization.
What is Japan’s endgame?
A massive debt load, an inability to cut deficits, debt monetization; all Japan’s roads lead to inflation. Not a little inflation, but hyperinflation. So says Dylan Gryce, a strategist at Societe Generale, and it’s hard to fault his case. This great Japanese unwind could start to happen sooner rather than later. Ironically, it could be triggered by expectations of global recovery, if this were to cause yields to be squeezed up worldwide. It wouldn’t take much of a yield increase for the Japanese economy to be sucked into a vicious cycle of higher deficits, caused by higher interest costs, forcing ever higher yields. Domestic investors have been content to fund the government’s shortfalls. But the domestic savings rate has been dropping as the country ages. Pretty soon it will go negative and the government will have to look to foreigners for finance. And foreigners won’t be content with 1% yields with the prospects of massive devaluation.
Where does that leave the rest of the world?
A number of things could happen if Japan were to succumb to hyperinflation. Investors would undoubtedly flee Japanese fixed-income investments. Would this benefit “high quality” sovereign debt elsewhere? Or would investors decide that all sovereign debt is due a higher risk premium. In which case, alternatives would be preferred? Most probably the sort of stuff that governments can’t make more of. Like commodities. What’s certain is that there would be some serious ructions in global markets.By Alen Mattich.WSJ.

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

Japans Economy Shows signs of Tanking

Crowded street in Japan. Click image to expand.
Will The Rising Suns Economy Set?

When the financial world tries to anticipate the next meltdown, all eyes turn to Europe. Greece needed a bailout, then Ireland did. Talk is that Spain will follow, though the country denies that it has a problem.

But a few contrarians think everyone is looking in the wrong direction. Forget Europe, they say. Check out Japan instead. "A global fiasco is brewing in Japan," predicted Societe Generale analyst Dylan Grice in a recent report. "It's like the Titanic has already hit the iceberg and you know it's going to sink, you just don't know how long it will take to go down," said Vitaliy Katsenelson, a Denver-based money manager, in a recent interview that was printed in well-known analyst John Mauldin's newsletter. One hedge fund analyst I spoke to recently noted that Japan has had no fewer than nine finance ministers in the last 4½ years—one of whom apparently committed suicide after resigning.

Japan was thought to possess a miracle economy before it all went to hell in the early 1990s following a spectacular real estate bust. Today the popular perception is that Japan is stagnant but stable. After the economy slowed down, the Japanese government lowered taxes and increased spending, sending deficits, and also government debt, way up. But the debt hasn't been a problem, because Japan's risk-averse populace—which became even more risk averse after the collapse of the technology bubble a decade ago—has sunk its considerable savings into government bonds, known colloquially as JGBs. What could be safer than government debt? As a result, the vast majority of Japanese debt is funded by its own residents—in stark contrast to the United States, which sells a sizable chunk of its debt overseas. And as deflation struck the Japanese economy, the interest rate on its outstanding debt has fallen to an average of a mere 1.5 percent.
In sum, the Japanese government has been able to increase its debt without driving borrowing costs up because of falling interest rates. That fortunate circumstance has allowed Japan to ramp up government spending even as tax revenue has dropped by nearly one-third .The not-so-lucky part is that even at today's low interest rates, Japan's interest on its debt is eating up a scary proportion of its tax revenue—more than 25 percent (not including the funds that come from issuing yet more debt), according to government figures. In addition, much of Japan's debt is relatively short-term in nature, meaning that the government last year had to "roll" at least 140 trillion yen in debt (i.e., replace retiring debt with new debt) even as it issued some 50 trillion in fresh debt to fund the growing gap between what the government spent and what it took in.
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As Bernie Madoff would tell you, this is a game you can play only so long. Japan's savings rate, which was once in the mid-teens, is quickly approaching zero. Meanwhile, the country has the oldest population in the world, with basically no immigration. When people retire, what do they do? They start to withdraw money from the banking system. You begin to see the problem.
Why, you might ask, can't Japan do what us profligate folk in the United States do—sell its debt to international investors? Well, it could, but it would likely have to pay a much higher interest rate than 1.5 percent. After all, if you were an investor, why would you buy Japanese debt yielding 1.5 percent when you could buy U.S. or German debt that paid you more? My source thinks Japan would have to pay roughly 4.5 percent interest on 10-year debt to be competitive, and he says that's a conservative estimate. But that would create a different problem. If Japan's interest rates merely doubled, from 1.5 percent to 3 percent, then interest expense would be more than half of the government's tax revenues. "Any meaningful re-pricing of Japanese sovereign risk would push yields to a level the government would be unable to pay," writes Grice.
Another way for Japan to dig itself out of this hole would be to cut spending. But already, Grice says, Japan's tax revenues can't cover debt service combined with social security. So where the hell do you start?
Those who believe in historical precedent point to examples like Weimar Germany and say Japan is going to swing from deflation to hyperinflation. The Bank of Japan, they say, will print yen in order to pay down debt. "Cash-strapped governments," observes Grice, often resort to "currency debasement." That story never ends happily.
But at least so far, the consensus is that this dire scenario won't, can't, happen. Indeed, it's often said that you aren't a real macro trader (someone who bets on global trends) until you've gotten burned shorting (i.e., betting against) Japan. "You'll find 10,000 people saying I'm an idiot and that people have been saying this, and been wrong, for 15 years, and kid, shut up," laughs my source. The Bank of Japan says the economy is improving; analysts say the government has lots of options, including raising the value-added tax or having the banking system put even more assets into government bonds. (Already, the Bank of Japan is engaged in its own form of "quantitative easing," or purchasing government bonds, which, just as in the United States, is supposed to help the economy recover.) Japan's relatively healthy corporate sector could take over from households in investing its surplus cash into government bonds. "Everyone acknowledges the long term seriousness of Japan's fiscal position," writes Grice. "But people seem almost fatigued with the idea that a country which has defied bond market logic for so long now is ever going to change."
But just because things haven't changed doesn't mean they won't. While any deterioration in Japan's finances should, mathematically speaking, happen gradually—savers don't yank their money out of the system all at once—modern markets have a way of accelerating underlying problems into crises with remarkable speed. If there's a lesson we should all have learned, it's that once fear takes hold, anything can happen. And if Japan is a problem, it's a problem for all of us. After all, Japan is still the world's third-largest economy. Unlike Greece and Ireland, it is simply too big to bail out, even if the world were willing to do so. China and Japan are the largest foreign holders of U.S. debt. One obvious question is, what happens here if Japan starts selling?
There's another way in which Japan's problems might matter, too. In some important ways, the United States is following in Japan's footsteps—for instance by taking advantage of low interest rates to issue a slew of cheap debt. Japan's "more profound influence might be psychological," Grice writes. What he means is that Japan's benign experience with debt (so far) has led other countries (notably ours) to think that it can have a worsening fiscal condition yet still pay a low interest rate on its debt . If bond markets begin to act like that notion is wrong, this story doesn't end happily for anyone.

Tuesday, December 21, 2010

More Money Than God: Hedge Funds and the Making of a New Elite

Review

There was only one reason to read this book and that was to obtain more information on the Medallion methodology. The author does provide information that hitherto was not public. For this I am grateful, but I would have liked, even more, a really deep interview with the various individuals involved in the development of Medallion.

For example, Berlekamp presents himself, on his website, as the creator of Medallion and the solver of its trading problems. He kicks himself for selling his share of this cash-generating marvel to the ruthless Medallion Pool Operator Owner for only six times the amount he had invested. I guess his intense need to play Dots and Boxes just overwhelmed his common sense.

Starting in the 1990's, hedge funds became large enough to move markets of all kinds. They could even overpower governments. This allowed the Tiger Fund in 1998 to approach "Russian friends...to buy the entire stock of nongold precious metals held by the central bank and finance ministry...take the palladium, the rhodium, and the silver. All of it." leaving the logistics problem of getting it into a Swiss bank with Tiger's name on it.

Money can be made in this lucrative venture and Sebastian Mallaby, will give you an education you won't find in any college. If you want to make a million, don't talk to an economic professor, go talk with a millionaire. If you want to make money with hedge funds, buy this book and do what Sebastian Mallaby tells you to do.

- it is often dangerous to trade on statistical evidence unless it can be intuitively explained". "Visceral" is the word meaning deep inward feelings rather than just an intellectual focus.

- "The whole point of leverage, the very definition of the term, is that investors feel ripples of the economy in a magnified way."

- We all rationalize success. One position by the Chanos Fund only worked out because the April 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstration broke out. This earned the comment "The way Ah see it, is that it took a revolution of a bihl-lion people for your darn short to work out."

- "Event driven" investing at Farallon Fund specialized in predicting events that cause existing prices to be wrong e.g. takeover announcements, demergers, avoiding bankruptcy, meeting banking covenants, major economic events, hybrid security maturity dates etc.

- `Pattern investing' used by the Medallion fund looking for patterns in the market. This applies research on French/English translation where the computer finds the grammatical rules not the programmer (using the Canadian Hansard which is conveniently in both languages).

- A Tiger Fund manager "should manage the portfolio aggressively, removing good companies to make way for better ones; should avoid risking more than 5 percent of capital on more than one bet; and should keep swinging through bad times until luck returned".

- Remember that "...the market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent".

- "If one of these stocks fell ... it was probably being pushed by an institutional block trader that needed to raise cash...the price would soon revert, creating an opportunity to profit." In other words, why is the seller selling?

- "the biggest danger for buyers of illiquid assets is that in a crisis these assets will collapse the hardest."

- "...the larger an investment fund, the harder it was for a fund manager to generate returns" meaning the small investor has more opportunity.

- And remember, "LTCM calculated that this loss should have occurred less than once in the lifetime of the universe. But it happened anyway." The market does not follow a normal distribution; often it is not random; but then is it often predictable?


Mallaby grapples with the variety of thought behind the success of the hedge funds giving us a workmanlike insight. This attempt to describe how the hedge funds actually operate - as far as he is able (and he tells us when he cannot) - makes this a valuable book indeed.

Saturday, December 18, 2010

Robert Glasper Experiment Live @ The Cotton Club TOKIA Marunouchi Tokyo

Which version of Robert Glasper would it be this time? With one foot in the straight-ahead jazz camp and one planted in hip-hop and funk, the American pianist has been carving out a dual identity. On his album Double Booked the two facets of his personality are laid out for all to see, tracks by his acoustic trio juxtaposed with the contemporary riffs of his other line-up, the Robert Glasper Experiment.

With Chris Dave on drums Glasper was certainly not short of firepower. Dave may be a diminutive figure, but he produced the most electrifying playing seen at this venue for a long time. Some parts of the set, in fact, came close to being a miniature drum concerto, Glasper laying down minimal accompaniment as his partner fired off round after round, at one point surging into a mesmerising drum ’n’ bass tattoo.

Memorable themes were thin on the ground, however. Glasper’s elliptical style, full of staccato runs and knotty harmonies, generates undeniable rhythmic tension but also runs the risk of turning in ever-decreasing circles. Glasper, who was in a jovial mood,  prefers to ditch set-lists to follow the mood of the moment.

The venue was Tokyo's Cotton Club in Marunouchi Finance precinct.
I attended the gig with Masayuki Koito (Finance Researcher) & Editor of Japans Jazz Magazine "The Walker".
http://www.t-walkers.com
The Cotton Club is high-end and offers a nice and more elegant change for the usual Tokyo nightspots.
The acoustics where brilliant while the band stage showcases a nostalgic remake of the Harlem Theater.
All in all, one of the best live performances I have every seen.
James Sleeman





Robert Glasper Experiment Live Cotton Club Tokyo 17/12/2010 -jimmy james by Spirit-Fingers


Rob's Birthday

the real robert glasper | Myspace Music Videos

2010 And Beyond - Deflation Japanese Style

"The cause of sustained price falls is a lack of demand. When demand itself is weak, prices won´t rise just through liquidity provision." – Masaaki Shirakawa, central bank governor of Japan
 
Japan’s structural problems are substantial and well known. A massively indebted government is under pressure to reduce the scale of its borrowings. Demographics are conducive to a contraction in the overall economy, given the impact of ageing is not being offset by net immigration, and Japan’s globally competitive exporters continue to face patchy conditions in most of their overseas markets. Furthermore, the savings rate remains high and bank lending is stagnant, therefore Japan remains susceptible to deflation.

None of this augurs well for Japan’s long-embattled commercial real estate sector. There is also the problem of gross oversupply of property – with the partial exception of the office and retail sub-sectors of Osaka. Over the last decade, Japan has essentially become over developed relative to the needs of its economy.

The last two years have been particularly harsh for the sector. data provided to me in March and July 2010 – confirm that rental rates fell sharply during 2009. Where there were property transactions, they generally resulted in substantial drops in capital values. More recently, there appear to have been minor rises in rents across the board. However, given the actual conditions and protagonists’ expectations, this appears to be little more than a bounce in the wake of a horrendous year. Our in-country sources expect rental rates to track sideways through 2011. Yields have moved in differing directions across the various sub-sectors. The fall in yields in Yokohama over the last year or so is probably reflective of an absence of transactions. The market clearing capital values and yields are, we suspect, respectively lower and higher than they currently appear to be. Looking forward, we expect that yields will track sideways. 
 
Looking back at the ‘Weak Decade´, we can´t avoid being reminded of Japan´s TWIN decades of weakness. Today, at about 10´380, the Nikkei 225 stands pretty much at the same (nominal) level as it did around 1987. And, it´s A LOT LOWER than it was at the end of its great bull market in 1989. On December 29, 1989, the Nikkei peaked at 38,876. In other words, the price levels of the Nikkei today stand at roughly a quarter of what they were 20 years ago...TWO decades later!

Saturday, December 11, 2010

James Howard Kunster – A Sense of Place.

Here’s another great TED talk that really has the ability to change the way you think about your surroundings, if you let it. James Howard Kunster tells it like it is. When talking about public spaces, urban sprawl, and creating a sense of place he describes, in general terms, what went wrong and how to fix it. I’ve posted some notes below, but I recommend you take 20 minutes and watch the video for yourself, it’s worth it:



Sense of Place – Your ability to make places that are meaningful and places of quality and character. This depends entirely on your ability to define space with buildings.
The public realm mainly comes in the form of the street in America because we don’t have the 1,000 year old cathedrals and market squares of older cultures.
The culture of civic design – a body of knowledge, methods, skills, and principles that we threw in the garbage after WWII and we can see the result all around us.
The public realm has to inform us not only where we are geographically, but it has to inform us where we are in our culture – where we’ve come from, what kind of people we are, and by doing that it needs to afford us a glimpse to where we’re going.
The places we’ve created over the past 50 years have deprived us of the ability to live in a hopeful present.
To create a place of character and quality you have to be able to define space.
We have about 38,000 places that are not worth caring about in the United States. When we have enough of them, we’re going to have a Nation that’s not worth defending.
The remedy for mutilated urbanism is good urbanism and good buildings, not just flower beds not just cartoons of the Sierra Nevada Mountains, that’s not good enough, we have to do good buildings.
The industrial city was such a trauma that we developed this tremendous aversion for the whole idea of the city, city life, and everything connected with it.
We have to downscale, rescale, and resize virtually everything in this country and we cannot start soon enough.
We’re gonna have to live closer to where we work, we’re gonna have to live closer to each other, we’re gonna have to live closer to where we produce food, we’re gonna have to improve our railroad system.
We have to re-learn how to compose meaningful places, places that are integral and are living organisms.
We need revivified town centers – our cities grew where they are because they occupy all the important sites.
Life in the 20th century is going to be about living locally. Be prepared to be good neighbors, be prepared to find vocations that make you useful to your neighbors and fellow citizens.
Stop referring to yourself as consumers. Consumers are different than citizens, consumers do not have responsibilities to their fellow human beings.

Commercial Real Estate Videos of the Week

Nicholas Smith, director & strategist at MF Global, explains his investment strategy for Japan and suggests investing in the country’s property and financial plays.


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Sunday, November 28, 2010

Massive Chinese Luxury Spending Shows The Real Estate Mania Is Spreading

pyramid

Tiffany results give excellent insight into the luxury market mania. At the flagship US store in New York sales were down 3%. It was up a modest 8% in the US as a whole. Japan was up 2%, but the rest of Asia was up a whopping 24%. Growth for sure, but Chinese consumer consumption is $2 trillion, or one-tenth the size of Europe and the US combined. I am not quite sure what to make of the 22% increase in Europe. Sales of items under $500 declined, but high end jewelry and diamond sales drive expensive purchases much higher. That, ladies and gents, is the foundation of the luxury boom of 2010.

The TIF result couldn’t be more clear. This mania is directly correlated to the Chinese speculative real estate mania, which I originally covered in a report in Russ Winter’s Actionable (a subscription service). This one makes the US real estate bubble look like child’s play. The Chinese authorities have taken measures to check this, but the mania has just spilled over into Hong Kong . As with all great manias, people feel that they have hit the jackpot, but in reality there are less than a million millionaires in China, suggesting that much of this fleeting bubble-mania wealth is driven by Wannabees. Wannabees drove the US housing bubble, and we are still dealing with the aftershocks. For those who wished they had played the US bust aggressively, now you have an even bigger mutha to play as China will be much worse.

A prevailing myth is that even in the US the wealthy are now carrying the consumer based economy. Usually when the discussion is centered around the US, the bottom 60% are dismissed as irrelevant, as if the US was really a banana republic of sorts. Nor is there particular concern about how this indebted lower tier affects the holdings (largely bonds and stocks) of the 5% who hold the securities that represent their debts. The belief is that the Fed or the government will take care of most of the risk of holding investments dependent on, drum roll please, debts owed by the lower 60% or 80% in the banana republic. Incidentally, despite the Ministry of Truth barrage going into Black Friday about improving employment, there were 1,651 mass layoff events (at least 50 workers) in October, resulting in 148K job losses – 121 more mass layoffs than in September.

Further aggravating the myth is that the retail sector is full of quasi-luxury retailers like JWN and COH who are getting the luxury bubble bath treatment. Apparently the idea here is that the top 20% are now doing great as well. I would suggest the obvious: excluding the top 5%, the rest of the top 20%, holds a much higher percentage of their wealth in housing rather than in financial assets. Therefore, that group is largely missing in action.

For sake of argument let’s consider that the top 5% are the drivers of this wealth and luxury theme. These people hold 72% of all the financial assets in the country. Obviously with the stock market having recovered a large portion of their 2008-2009 losses, these people are feeling somewhat wealthier compared to a year ago. The only problem with this is that if we use mutual fund flows as a surrogate for where these folks put their money, their participation was muted.

pyramid
pyramid

The wealthy have put money into the aforementioned mania induced emerging market bubble to the tune of $83.3 billion in 2009, and $79.9 billion so far in 2010. Connecting the dots, a bust in inflated luxury stocks should correlate well to an emerging market equity and debt bust.

The wealthy have also put money into tax free bond funds ($30 billion in 2010) as part of some misguided derisking play, and to squeeze out a little extra yield. A half a trillion is parked in these funds, although last reported week 1% was pulled out. I suppose a plutocrat opening his monthly statement at the end of August and September and on the eve of QE2 might feel smug enough to engage in some luxury spending hysterics. That has now come and gone, as any benefit or gain from investing in tax free bonds in 2010 has also come and gone.


Thursday, November 25, 2010

Japan's commercial properties have largest debt-funding gap in Asia Pacific

Japan's commercial properties have the largest debt-funding gap in Asia Pacific, at US$70 billion.

This is according to research by real estate firm DTZ.

The funding gap is defined as the difference between the debt secured by a commercial property that is maturing and needs to be paid, and the debt that is available to fill the vacuum.

According to DTZ Asia Pacific Research, aside from Japan, the only other markets in Asia-Pacific with funding gaps are Australia and New Zealand. However, the shortfalls in these countries are only US$500 million and US$100 million, respectively.

DTZ added that despite a development boom in China and India recently, neither has a debt-funding gap as capital values have held up.

As a result, DTZ said both countries have been insulated against any significant downturn.

Globally, DTZ also estimates that US$376 billion of equity capital is available for investment in commercial properties in the next three years.

This works out to more than 1.5 times the estimated global debt-funding gap in the next three years, which DTZ estimates at US$245 billion.

However, DTZ cautions that the debt-funding gap continues to be the biggest challenge in many international property markets.